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The structure of defense spending in Indonesia State Budget 
consists of three types of spending, which are routine 
expenditure, goods expenditure, and capital expenditure. It 
shows the changes in consumption expenditure contribution, 
direct investment expenditure, and indirect investment from 
the government. According to The Global Competitiveness 
Report 2016-2017, Indonesia presents a low level of security 
stability among 138 countries. Due to the terrorism threat, 
Indonesia is ranked 115 (Global Competitive Index or 
GCI=4,2) for business cost, at the 102nd ranking (GCI=3,9) 
for the business cost caused by crime and violence, and 108th 
ranking (GCI=4,1) for organized crime. This study aims to 
examine the impact of military expenditure on security 
stability in Indonesia. The analytical method used in this 
study is explanatory, it aims to explain the causal relationship 
between variables and hypothesis testing. This study employs 
the time series data with per semester data series through 
2000-2018. The research model is formulated as a recursive 
linear model in the form of a Cobb-Douglas production 
function and analyzed using multiple linear regression 
analysis with the Ordinary Least Square method. The result 
reveals that both military expenditure and security 
expenditure have impacted simultaneously on security 
stability. The integration of all components of military 
expenditure synergistically can increase Security Stability. 
The components of spending that have a partially significant 
positive effect on Security Stability are expenditures on goods 
and capital expenditures. 
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INTRODUCTION  
According to its function, military 
expenditure is the number of financial 
resources dedicated by a state to raising and 
maintaining the armed forces or other 
methods essential for defense purposes. 
 




Referring to Suparmoko (2003), according 
to the designation, military expenditure is 
the country's spending for national defense. 
The budget allocation for defense 
expenditure decreased by 0.6% in 2018, on 
the contrary, the security budget raised to 
5.9% in the same year. Overall, the budget 
allocation for defense and security 
increased in 2018 by 2.1%. Based on the 
Minister of Finance Regulation No. 101/ 
PMK.02/2011 concerning Budget 
Classification (Law Number 101, 2011). 
The allocation of defense expenditure is 
broken down into allocations for national 
defense, defense support, foreign military 
assistance, defense research and 
development, and other defenses. In the 
spending structure of state ministries and 
institutions (K/L Expenditures), the budget 
allocation for defense is a budget allocation 
for the Ministry of Defense (whose 
expenditure is divided between the Ministry 
of Defense and the Indonesia National 
Armed Forces, that consist of Indonesia 
Armed Forces Headquarters (Mabes TNI), 
Indonesia Army (TNI AD), Indonesia Navy 
(TNI AL), and Indonesia Air Force (TNI 
AU). 
According to its function, security 
expenditure is government spending that is 
used to preserve national defense and 
security (Salawu, 2005). Meanwhile, 
defense expenditure and security 
expenditure are part of government 
expenditure aim to improve economic 
resilience. Yusgiantoro (2004) argues that 
the result of defense activity is public goods 
which non-excludable and non-rivalry. In 
the long term, the improvements in military 
expenditure and security expenditure 
contribution will enhance security stability. 
In Indonesia, Indonesia Police responsible 
for the security aspect. Regarding the 
Minister of Finance Regulation 
101/PMK.02/2011 about budget 
classification, the defense budget is 
allocated into two groups, namely military 
expenditure for supporting defense aspect 
and security expenditure for security aspect 
that managed by Indonesia Police. 
Referring to Hartley & Sandler (1995), 
in terms of macroeconomics, defense 
economics is a study of resource allocation, 
income distribution, economic growth, and 
stabilization applied to topics related to 
defense. There are three main actors in 
economic activity in a country, which are 
government, companies, and households 
(Goode, 1984). The contribution of the type 
of defense spending on security as a 
measure of the structure of defense 
spending is in line with the method of 
measuring the economic structure of 
Yotopoulos and Nugent (1976). In 
economic studies, defense economics is a 
relatively new discipline, started by Hitch 
and McKean in an article entitled The 
Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age 
in 1960, which stated that the problem of 
national defense is economic (Hartley, 
2007). 
The structure of military expenditure in 
the state budget consists of routine 
expenditure, goods expenditure, and capital 
expenditure. It shows the changes in the 
contribution of consumption spending, 
indirect investment spending, and direct 
investment expenditure from the 
government. (Ministry of Finance, 2011). 
The structure of state spending is 
increasingly developing towards spending 
efficiency, especially through savings on 
routine and goods expenditure (Ministry of 
Finance, 2011). The larger the economic 
scale, the number of population will follow 
with Indonesia's geographical condition, 
Indonesia responsible to maintain the 
defense policy to protect the national 
interest. Referring to the theory of structural 
change from Chenery (1979), the increasing 
contribution of military spending will 
increase security stability. It represents the 
rise of routine expenditure contribution, 
goods expenditure, and capital expenditure 
as a form of a structural transformation of 
government spending in the military 
budget. Regarding this, security stability is 
the output of increased national defense and 
security capacity, more effective use of 
resources, and changes in security policies 
 




and strategies (social transformation or 
defense and security sector) that are more 
constructive (Chang, 2003). The underlying 
assumption is that security stability is the 
goal of carrying out the main duties of the 
Indonesia Armed Forces in maintaining 
national defense and security as regulated in 
law.  
Since reforms, the national security 
system has been built with an approach of 
citizen and community participation or 
security sector reform according to Born 
and Flupi (2006). The formulation of the 
problem is how the influence of the 
Defense-Security Expenditure Structure on 
security stability in Indonesia. Through this 
research, it is hoped that an effective 
strategy to improve public welfare based on 
the contribution of the defense sector can be 
developed through the transformation of the 
structure of military spending that can 
promote increased security stability. 
Referring to Suparmoko (2003), military 
spending includes state spending to increase 
economic strength and resilience. 
Ministry of Defense and Indonesia 
Police are the two biggest ministries or 
institutions with the biggest budget 
allocations. Therefore, the rise of defense 
and security budget allocation along with 
the minister and institution policy for 
supporting defense and security stability. 
Indonesia's government plans to raise the 
defense allocation to 1,5% of gross 
domestic to in the long term. This discourse 
is used to anticipate the higher size of 
economics in the long term. According to 
the Ministry of Finance (2018), with the 
higher economy of scale and the higher 
population with a large geographical 
condition, Indonesia needs the right policy 
of defense and security.  
This study tries to examine the impact of 
military expenditure on security stability in 
Indonesia. The results of this study are 
expected to be used as study material for the 
formulation of development policies for the 
defense sector in Indonesia, particularly in 
transforming  the structure  of  government  
spending in the military budget that can 
effectively improve security stability in 
Indonesia. The formulation of state income 
and government expenditure is intended to 
create efficiency through various regarding 




The subject of this research is the Ministry 
of Defense. This research uses semesterly 
data from 2000 to 2018 period. The 
sampling method used was convenience 
sampling according to the availability of the 
required research data. The variables used 
are military expenditure structure (x) and 
strategic industry growth (y), those data are 
collected from the Ministry of Defense, the 
Central Statistic Agency (BPS, 2003), and 
World Economic Forum (World Economic 
Forum, 2016). 
Besides, the research variables consisted 
of independent variables and dependent 
variables. The independent variables are 
military Expenditure Structure (X) which 
consists of Routine Expenditure 
Contribution (X1), Goods Expenditure 
Contribution (X2), and Capital Expenditure 
Contribution (X3). the dependent variable 
is the strategic industry growth (Y). The 
research design used is an explanatory 
study or hypothesis testing study which 
aims to explain and test hypotheses about 
the relationship between variables.  
The statistical analysis technique used in 
this study is linear regression analysis in the 
Cobb-Douglas production function model. 
Regression analysis can capture the pattern 
of the relationship between one or more 
causal (exogenous) variables to one 
consequent (endogenous) variable. All data 
processing and analysis in this study were 
carried out with eViews 10 for Windows 
computer program. The analysis used in 
testing the hypothesis is regression analysis. 
The structural equation that shows the 
causative relationship between variables 
after logarithmic transformation is as 
follows: 
 




Ln Y = b01 + b11 Ln X1 + b21 Ln X2 + b31 
Ln X3 + e 
Information: 
X1, X2, X3 = Contribution of Routine, 
Goods, and Capital 
Expenditures  
LnY = Security Stability  
b0j = constanta or intercept (b0j = Ln B0j 
dan and B0j = Total Multi Factor 
Productivity) 
bij  = regression coefficient (i > 0) 
e = residual or error term 
 
Hypothesis testing 
a.  F test 
The F test is used to test the significance 
of the simultaneous effect by testing all 
regression coefficients simultaneously. 
To determine F table, the level of 
significance used is 5% with degrees of 
freedom: db1 = (k) and db2 = (n-k-1), 
where k = the number of causal variables 
and n = the number of data. The degrees 
of freedom in statistical tests depend on 
the number of causal variables and the 
amount of data used. The research 
hypothesis about the simultaneous 
influence is rejected (Ha is rejected or 
Ho is accepted) if F count > F table, 
meaning that there is a significant 
influence of the causal variables 
simultaneously on the effect variable. On 
the other hand, the research hypothesis 
about the existence of a simultaneous 
effect is accepted (Ha is accepted or Ho 
is rejected) if F count α F table, meaning 
that there is no significant effect of the 
causal variables simultaneously on the 
effect variable. 
b. T-test  
The t-test is used to test the significance 
of partial or individual effects through 
testing on each or a regression 
coefficient. To determine the t table, the 
level of significance used is 5 percent 
with degrees of freedom db = (n-k-1). 
The research hypothesis about the 
existence of partial influence or 
individual influence is positively 
accepted (Ha is accepted or Ho is 
rejected) if t count> t table, meaning that 
there is a significant positive effect of the 
causal variable partially or individually 
on the effect variable. On the other hand, 
the research hypothesis about the 
existence of a partial influence or 
positive individual influence is rejected 
(Ha is rejected or Ho is accepted) if t 
count α t table, meaning that there is no 
significant positive effect of the causal 
variable partially or individually on the 
effect variable.  
The research hypothesis about the 
existence of a partial influence or negative 
individual influence is accepted (Ha is 
accepted or Ho is rejected) if t <-t table, 
meaning that there is a significant negative 
effect of the causal variable partially or 
individually on the effect variable. On the 
other hand, the research hypothesis about 
the existence of a partial influence or 
negative individual influence is rejected 
(Ha is rejected or Ho is accepted) if t count 
α -t table, meaning that there is no 
significant negative effect of the causal 
variable partially or individually on the 
variable as a result. 
In the regression analysis, the required 
classical assumption tests are carried out. 
The assumption tests include normality test, 
multicollinearity test, heteroscedasticity 
test, and autocorrelation test. The statistical 
hypothesis tested for the effect of the 
military Expenditure Structure on security 
stability is as follows:  
Ho: all αij = 0; meaning that there is no 
influence from the causal variable 
on the effect variable.  
Ha: there is at least one αij ≠ 0; meaning 
that there is an influence from the 
causal variable on the effect 
variable.  
The statistical hypothesis tested for the 
effect of the military expenditure structure 
on security stability is as follows:  
Ho: αij ≤ 0; meaning that there is no 
positive effect of a causal variable 
on the effect variable.  
Ha: αij> 0; it means that there is a 
positive influence from a causal 
variable on the effect variable. 
 




RESULT AND DISCUSSION  
Assumption Test Results  
The results of testing the classical 
assumptions on the model of the influence 
of the Military Expenditure Structure on 
Security Stability shows that the model has 
met the classical assumptions required, 
known as normally distributed, there is no 
multicollinearity situation, autocorrelation, 
and heteroscedasticity. The consideration 
of the need to test classic assumptions in the 
regression analysis model is to avoid bias 
that makes the regression results cannot 
estimate well or are BLUE (Best Linear 
Unbiased Estimator). The classical 
assumption test results for the above 
models are described in the following 
sections. The results of the normality test as 
shown in the illustration below show that 
the model residues are normally distributed.  
The normality test is performed using 
the Jarque-Bera statistic to test whether the 
model residues are normally distributed. 
The residual model is the difference 
between the Y1 observations and the Y1 
predictions of the model. From the test 
results obtained the Jarque-Bera statistical 
value Z = 0.549 with a probability of error 
or p-value = 0.760. It appears that the test 
results are non-significant where the p-
value> ( = 0.05). Thus it was decided that 
the model residues were normally 
distributed at an error level of 5%. This 
normal distribution is also indicated by the 
histogram of the data distribution which 
tends to form a normal curve (bell-shaped). 
 
Statistical Hypothesis 
Ho: ij ≤ 0; it means that there is no positive 
effect of a causal variable partially on 
the effect variable.  
Ha: ij> 0; it means that there is a positive 
influence from a causal variable 
partially on the effect variable.  
While the statistical hypothesis test for the 
effect of Economic Growth on Income 
Inequality is as follows:  
Ho: ij ≥ 0; it means that there is no 
negative effect of a causal variable on  
 
the effect variable.  
Ha: ij <0; it means that there is a negative 
effect of a causal variable on the effect 
variable. 
The multicollinearity test was performed 
using the Variance Inflation Factor or VIF 
statistics. This value indicates the level of 
closeness of the relationship between an 
independent variable and all other 
independent variables. It is decided that a 
model does not contain a multicollinearity 
situation if all VIF values are <10.As shown 
in the illustration below, all independent 
variables involved in the analyzed model 
have a VIF value <10 (VIFX1 = 1.599; 
VIFX2 = 1.773; and VIFX3 = 2.54 ). 
The results of this analysis indicate that 
there is no multicollinearity situation. The 
results of further analysis through 
observation of the regression model also 
showed that there was no multicollinearity 
situation. This is because the results of the 
partial effect test of each independent 
variable in the model are consistent with the 
results of the simultaneous effect test. It can 
be seen in Table 1 (see Appendix Page). 
The results of the F test are significant (p = 
0.009), which indicates that at least one 
independent variable has a significant 
spatial effect. The results of the F test are 
consistent with the results of the t-test, 
where the variables X2 and X3 have a 
significant effect (p = .0.0495 and p = 
0.0214). Thus, it can be concluded that 
there is no multicollinearity situation in the 
model.  
In the case of a model containing a high 
multicollinearity situation, Gujarati (2003) 
suggests observing the resulting regression 
model to detect whether the 
multicollinearity situation that occurs is a) 
favorable, b) ineffective, or c) damaging the 
model. In cases a) and b), it is acceptable to 
involve all independent variables that 
contribute to the multicollinearity situation. 
In case of c), namely breaking the model, 
the results of the F test and the results of the 
t-test will be inconsistent (bias). As 
described in Chapter III, VIF is calculated  
 
 




based on the formula: 
   
where: 1 - R2 = tolerance. 
The heteroscedasticity test was carried out 
using the White method, which measures the 
correlation between the squares of the model 
residue and all independent variables. The 
test results show that there is no 
heteroscedasticity situation in the model. 
From the analysis, it was found that the p-
value was greater than the significance level 
 = 0.05 or non-significant.  
The autocorrelation test was examined 
using the Durbin-Watson statistic on the 
model. The test result shows that there is no 
autocorrelation situation in the model. 
From the results of the analysis, the Durbin-
Watson statistical value is d = 2,236. This 
value lies in the decision area that there is 
no autocorrelation situation in the model at 
an error rate of 5%. As referring to Gujarati 
(Gujarati, 2003) that the value of d which is 
close to 2 has a low autocorrelation 
coefficient. 
 
Result of Hypothesis Testing  
The results of hypothesis testing regarding 
the impact of the Military Expenditure 
Structure on Security Stability can be seen 
in the regression equation below: 
Ln Y = b01 + b11 Ln X1 + b21 Ln X2 + b31 Ln 
X3 + e  
Ln Y = 0,498 - 3,243 Ln X1 + 0,191 Ln X2 
+ 1,745 Ln X3 + e 
 (0,828) (-0,382)




1,745.u1    
(1,645 = 2,720,498; antilog natural) 
Information:  
X1 = Routine Shopping Contribution  
X2= Contribution of Goods Expenditure 
X3 = Capital Expenditure Contribution  
Y = Security Stability 
 
In the model of the impact of the 
Military Expenditure Structure on Security 
Stability above, the trend of changes in the 
contribution of spending components to 
security stability shows the trend towards 
the effect of the partial contribution of 
spending components in the logarithmic 
model. Constants: b01=0.498, if the natural 
logarithm of all causal variables = 0 (zero) 
then the mathematical value of the natural 
logarithm of Security Stability is 0.498 
units. The regression coefficient for 
Contribution of Routine Expenditures: 
b11= -3,243; if the Contribution of Routine 
Expenditures increases by 1 unit, under 
conditions other factors are constant, then 
Security Stability tends to decrease by 
3.243 units. The regression coefficient for 
Contribution of Goods Expenditures: b21 = 
0.191; if the Contribution of Goods 
Expenditures increases by 1 unit, under 
conditions other factors are constant, then 
Security Stability tends to increase by 0.191 
units. The regression coefficient for Capital 
Expenditure Contribution: b31 = 1,745; if 
the Contribution of Capital Expenditures 
increases by 1 unit, under conditions other 
factors are constant, then Security Stability 
tends to increase by 1.745 units. It appears 
that the response to changes in Security 
Stability due to changes in the contribution 
of spending components varies according to 
the type of component. 
The impact of the military expenditure 
and security expenditure on security 
stability is shown by the adjusted 
coefficient of determination (Adjusted R2) 
simultaneously, which is 80.2% with a 
statistical value-F = 4.211. Referring to the 
multiple correlation coefficient values of R 
= 0.896 (obtained from the root of Adjusted 
R2) shows that the simultaneous influence 
of all expenditure component contributions 
to Security Stability is strong, according to 
Guilford, 1956: 145 that with an R-value 
between 0.70 - 0.90  
From the results of the significance test, 
it is found that Fcount is greater than Ftable 
= 3.127 (Ftable value at 5% error level and 
degrees of freedom db1 = k = 3, db2 = nk-1 
= 34) which indicates that the military 
expenditure structure has a significant 
effect simultaneously on security stability 
at an error rate of  5%. Thus, H0 is rejected 












simultaneous effect of the military 
expenditure structure on security stability is 
accepted. The data examining result also 
shows the large variation in Security 
Stability which can be explained by all 
causal variables simultaneously, namely 
Adjusted R2 = 80.2%. The remainder of the 
variation, 19.8% or 1 - Adjusted R2, is 
explained by other factors not examined. 
Table 2 and Table 3 (see Appendix Page) 
show the significant test results that show the 
effect of the contribution of the three 
components of spending (X) simultaneously 
on Security Stability (Y). The integration of 
the three components of spending increases the 
effectiveness of achieving Security Stability. 
The strength of the simultaneous influence is 
indicated by the multiple correlation 
coefficient R, while the magnitude of the 
simultaneous effect is shown by the multiple 
determination coefficient R2.  
The partial effect of the Contribution of 
Routine Spending on Security Stability is 
shown by the regression coefficient b11= -
3.243 with a statistical value-t = -0.382. From 
the results of the significance test, it is found 
that tcount is smaller than ttable = 1.729 
(ttable value at 5% error level of 1-sided test 
type and degrees of freedom nk-1 = 34) 
which indicates that the Contribution of 
Routine Spending has no partial positive 
effect on Security Stability in 5% error rate. 
Thus, H0 is accepted and the research 
hypothesis regarding the partial positive 
influence of the Contribution of Routine 
Spending on Security Stability is rejected. 
Descriptively, the direction of this negative 
influence shows that the decline in the 
Contribution of Routine Spending tends to be 
followed by an increase in Security Stability. 
However, the effect is not significant. In 
summary, as in the form of the description 
above, the effect of the partial contribution of 
each component of spending to Security 
Stability is presented in Table 4 (see 
Appendix Page). 
Table 4 shows that the Contribution of 
Goods Expenditures (X2) and Contribution 
of Capital Expenditures (X3) has a partially 
significant positive effect on Security 
Stability (Y). While the Contribution of 
Routine Expenditures (X1) has no partially 
significant positive effect on Security 
Stability (Y). However, the effect of the 
simultaneous contribution of these three 
components of expenditure is significant. 
Partially, the Contribution of Goods 
Expenditures and Contribution of Capital 
Expenditures have a significant positive 
effect on Security Stability, while the 
Contribution of Routine Expenditures has a 
negative effect, but not significant. The 
positive impact of the Contribution of 
Goods Expenditures and Contribution of 
Capital Expenditures to Security Stability 
shows that a higher Contribution of Goods 
Expenditures and Contribution of Capital 
Expenditures if the contribution of other 
components of expenditure is constant, it 
improves the government to produce higher 
security stability. These results indicate that 
the Contribution of Goods Expenditures 
and Contribution of Capital Expenditures 
play a role in producing a higher Security 
Stability. Meanwhile, the direction of the 
insignificant negative influence of the 
Contribution of Routine Expenditures 
indicates a decrease in the Contribution of 
Routine Expenditures in Indonesia in line 
with the increase in Security Stability as a 
result of budget transfers from routine 
expenditures to goods and capital 
expenditures due to the increased need for 
procurement and investment for defense 
and security. 
Based on the analysis results, the 
dominant variables in the model are the 
Contribution of Capital Expenditure. 
Contribution of Capital Expenditure is the 
dominant variable compared to the 
contribution of other spending components 
which constructively affects Security 
Stability. The contribution of capital 
expenditure has the greatest elasticity 
(regression coefficient). This shows that the 
Contribution of Capital Expenditure is the 
strongest driver in supporting the increase 
of Security Stability. However, the joint 
influence implies that an increase in the 
contribution of all components of spending 
 




that is constructive (leading to a positive 
effect) is more capable of increasing higher 
security stability.  
Based on the results of the study, as a 
finding, this study shows that the model of 
the influence of the factors under study on 
Security Stability has a very high level of 
conformity, as reflected in the coefficient of 
determination. However, in the framework 
of alternative solutions to increase Security 
Stability, the results of this modeling still 
open up opportunities for further research to 
develop models composed of other factors 
that are not researched which theoretically 
also affect Security Stability. 
As a solution model for increasing 
Security Stability, the results of the model 
test show that efforts to increase Security 
Stability can be made through efforts to 
increase the contribution of components of 
military spending which are proven to have 
a positive direction together. Budget 
policies that are relevant in increasing 
Security Stability are increasing the 
Contribution of Goods and Capital 
Expenditures as well as improving the 




The results of this study indicate a pattern 
of structural change that is similar to the 
results of the Chenery and Syrquin research 
(Chenery & Srinivasan, 1993). The results 
of both studies show that the contribution of 
the industrial and service sectors tends to 
increase with the increase in per capita 
income, while the contribution of the 
primary sector tends to decrease as a 
consequence of the increased contribution 
of the industrial and service sectors. 
Military expenditure structure consists 
of the contribution of Routine 
Expenditures, Goods Expenditures, and 
Capital Expenditures has a simultaneous 
effect on Security Stability. The integration 
of all components of defense-security 
spending synergistically can increase 
Security Stability. The components of 
spending that have a partially significant 
positive effect on Security Stability are 
expenditures on goods and capital 
expenditures. The increase in the 
contribution of goods and capital 
expenditures, by taking into account the 
linkages between spending components, 
can improve security stability.  
Practical suggestions are to increase the 
growth of strategic industries, it is 
suggested for the government to evaluate 
the defense and security spending 
budgeting policies, especially the adequacy 
of allocation, level of priority, and the 
relationship between the expenditure 
components.  
As academic advice, it is suggested to 
other researchers to expand the scope of 
research by involving external factors other 
than the structure of defense-security 
spending which theoretically affects the 
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Table 1. Multicollinearity Test Results Model of the Influence 






Source: Processed by Authors, 2020 
 
Table 1. The Regression Equation Model Influence  
of Defense-Security Spending Structure on Security Stability 
Dependent Variable: Y   
Method: Least Squares   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.497619 60.10834 0.827871 0.4227 
X1 -3.243043 8.479366 -0.382463 0.1203 
X2 0.190983 0.077156 2.475300 0.0495 
X3 1.745363 0.617852 2.824889 0.0214 
R-squared 0.821542     Mean dependent var 2.030175 
Adjusted R-squared 0.801867     S.D. dependent var 0.554971 
S.E. of regression 0.383747     Akaike info criterion 1.221351 
Sum squared resid 1.914398     Schwarz criterion 1.715045 
Log likelihood 4.045541     F-statistic 4.211255 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.236083     Prob(F-statistic) 0.009254 
Source: Processed by Authors, 2020 
 
Table 2. Result of Simultaneous Effect Test  
on Defense-Security Expenditure Structure against Security Stability 
Simultan Influences R2 Adjusted R2 Fhitung p-value 
Contribution of All 
Components of Shopping 
(X1, X2, X3) 
82,2% 80,2% 4,211* 0,009* 
Description:  
Ftable = F0,05(3,34) = 3,127 (F table b = 5% and db1 = k = 3; db2 = n-k-1 = 34) 
R2 = multiple coefficient determination,  
Adjusted R2 = adjusted coefficient determination,  
* = significant 
Source: Processed by Authors, 2020 
 
Table 3. Result of Partial Effect Test  
on Defense-Security Expenditure Structure against Security Stability 
Partial Influence    bi1 thitung p-value 
Routine Shopping Contribution 
(X1) 
-3,243 -0,382ns 0,1203ns 
Goods Shopping Contribution 
(X2) 
0,191 2,475* 0,0495* 
Capital Expenditure 
Contribution (X3) 
1,745 2,825* 0,0214* 
Description:  
ttabel = t0,05(34) = 1,729  (t-tabel score at α =5%, one tail, db = n-k-1 = 34) 
bi1 = regression coefficient, ns = non-signifficant, * = signifficant 
Source: Processed by Authors, 2020 
Function for R2 Tolerance VIF 
X1 0.375 0.625 1.599 
X2 0.436 0.564 1.773 
X3 0.607 0.393 2.543 
 




Table 5. Military Expenditures and Defense-Security Component Contribution in Indonesia Period 2000-2018 (Years Data) 
  Defense Expenditures Security Expenditures Security Expenditures 
Contribution of Defense-Security 
Expenditure Component 
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(%) (%) (%) 
No. Years X1 X2 X3                         
1 2000 4.764 1.920 5.371 12.054,0 2.249 906 2.536 5.691 7.013 2.826 7.906 17.745 39,5 15,9 44,6 
2 2001 6.597 2.673 7.398 16.668,3 3.115 1.262 3.493 7.870 9.711 3.935 10.892 24.538 39,6 16,0 44,4 
3 2002 5.688 2.330 6.313 14.330,9 2.685 1.100 2.981 6.766 8.373 3.431 9.293 21.097 39,7 16,3 44,1 
4 2003 6.542 2.739 7.111 16.392,1 3.089 1.293 3.357 7.739 9.631 4.032 10.468 24.131 39,9 16,7 43,4 
5 2004 7.680 3.351 8.002 19.032,9 3.626 1.582 3.778 8.986 11.306 4.933 11.779 28.019 40,4 17,6 42,0 
6 2005 9.529 4.484 9.095 23.108,1 4.499 2.117 4.294 10.910 14.028 6.600 13.390 34.018 41,2 19,4 39,4 
7 2006 12.141 6.491 9.598 28.229,2 7.615 4.071 6.020 17.706 19.755 10.562 15.618 45.935 43,0 23,0 34,0 
8 2007 14.641 8.060 9.939 32.640,1 9.172 5.049 6.226 20.448 23.813 13.110 16.165 53.088 44,9 24,7 30,4 
9 2008 17.764 8.251 6.856 32.871,1 5.764 2.677 2.225 10.666 23.527 10.929 9.081 43.537 54,0 25,1 20,9 
10 2009 19.714 8.211 5.672 33.597,6 5.936 2.472 1.708 10.116 25.649 10.684 7.380 43.713 58,7 24,4 16,9 
11 2010 24.512 15.042 12.799 52.352,3 4.892 3.002 2.554 10.448 29.404 18.044 15.353 62.800 46,8 28,7 24,4 
12 2011 30.373 10.149 17.670 58.192,1 8.062 2.694 4.690 15.447 38.435 12.843 22.361 73.639 52,2 17,4 30,4 
13 2012 34.908 11.280 27.918 74.106,4 9.594 3.100 7.673 20.368 44.502 14.381 35.591 94.474 47,1 15,2 37,7 
14 2013 37.046 12.848 42.223 92.117,1 10.168 3.527 11.589 25.284 47.214 16.375 53.812 117.401 40,2 13,9 45,8 
15 2014 36.948 16.878 32.551 86.376,7 10.437 4.768 9.195 24.400 47.385 21.645 41.746 110.776 42,8 19,5 37,7 
16 2015 38.876 26.837 31.222 96.935,7 14.862 10.260 11.936 37.059 53.739 37.097 43.159 133.995 40,1 27,7 32,2 
17 2016 41.388 28.423 29.651 99.462,0 33.017 22.674 23.654 79.345 74.406 51.096 53.305 178.807 41,6 28,6 29,8 
18 2017 42.229 33.924 31.858 
108.011,
8 
37.151 29.845 28.028 95.024 79.381 63.769 59.886 203.035 39,1 31,4 29,5 
19 2018 41.924 35.695 30.064 
107.682,
4 
35.947 30.606 25.778 92.331 77.870 66.301 55.842 200.013 38,9 33,1 27,9 
Source: Processed by Authors, 2020
 




Source: Processed by Authors, 2020  
 
Table 7. Military Expenditure Structure and Security Stability  
for the Period of 2000-2018 (Semester Data) 







Stability    
   (%) (%) (%) Index 
No. Years Semester X1 X2 X3 Y1 
1 
2000 
I #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! 
2 II #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! 
3 
2001 
I 19,8 8,0 22,2 1,6 
4 II 19,8 8,0 22,2 1,7 
5 
2002 
I 19,8 8,1 22,1 1,8 
6 II 19,9 8,2 22,0 1,9 
7 
2003 
I 19,9 8,3 21,8 2,0 
8 II 20,0 8,4 21,6 2,0 
9 
2004 
I 20,1 8,7 21,2 2,1 
10 II 20,2 8,9 20,9 2,2 
11 
2005 
I 20,5 9,5 20,0 2,3 
12 II 20,7 9,9 19,3 2,4 
13 
2006 
I 21,3 11,0 17,7 2,4 
14 II 21,7 11,9 16,3 2,5 
15 
2007 
I 22,2 12,1 15,7 2,5 
16 II 22,7 12,6 14,8 2,5 
17 
2008 
I 25,9 12,5 11,6 2,5 
18 II 28,2 12,6 9,2 2,5 
Table 6. Military Expenditure Structure and Security Stability  
for the Period 2000-2018 (Years Data) 








  (%) (%) (%) Index 
No. Years X1 X2 X3 Y1 
1 2000 39,5 15,9 44,6 3,0 
2 2001 39,6 16,0 44,4 3,4 
3 2002 39,7 16,3 44,1 3,7 
4 2003 39,9 16,7 43,4 4,0 
5 2004 40,4 17,6 42,0 4,3 
6 2005 41,2 19,4 39,4 4,6 
7 2006 43,0 23,0 34,0 5,0 
8 2007 44,9 24,7 30,4 5,0 
9 2008 54,0 25,1 20,9 5,0 
10 2009 58,7 24,4 16,9 4,8 
11 2010 46,8 28,7 24,4 4,6 
12 2011 52,2 17,4 30,4 4,2 
13 2012 47,1 15,2 37,7 4,2 
14 2013 40,2 13,9 45,8 4,3 
15 2014 42,8 19,5 37,7 4,3 
16 2015 40,1 27,7 32,2 4,1 
17 2016 41,6 28,6 29,8 4,1 
18 2017 39,1 31,4 29,5 4,3 
19 2018 38,9 33,1 27,9 5,4 
 






I 28,8 12,3 8,9 2,4 
20 II 29,9 12,1 7,9 2,4 
21 
2010 
I 24,9 13,8 11,3 2,3 
22 II 21,9 14,9 13,2 2,3 
23 
2011 
I 25,4 10,1 14,4 2,2 
24 II 26,8 7,3 15,9 2,1 
25 
2012 
I 24,2 7,9 17,9 2,1 
26 II 22,9 7,3 19,7 2,1 
27 
2013 
I 21,0 7,1 21,9 2,1 
28 II 19,2 6,8 23,9 2,1 
29 
2014 
I 21,1 9,1 19,9 2,1 
30 II 21,7 10,5 17,8 2,2 
31 
2015 
I 20,4 12,8 16,8 2,1 
32 II 19,7 14,9 15,4 2,0 
33 
2016 
I 20,6 14,2 15,2 2,1 
34 II 21,0 14,4 14,6 2,1 
35 
2017 
I 19,9 15,3 14,8 2,1 
36 II 19,2 16,1 14,7 2,1 
37 
2018 
I 19,5 16,4 14,2 2,6 
38 II 19,4 16,8 13,8 2,8 
  Semester I: S1t = 0,5*(Xt - ((3/12)*(Xt - Xt-1)))  
  Semester II: S2t =  0,5*(Xt + ((3/12)*(Xt - Xt-1)))  
Source: Processed by Authors, 2020 
 
Table 8. Military Expenditure Structure and Security Stability for the period 2000-2018 
(Semester data, Logaritmic Transformation) 








Etability    
   (Ln) (Ln) (Ln) (Ln) 
No. Years Semester X1 X2 X3 Y1 
1 
2000 
I #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! 
2 II #REF! #REF! #REF! #REF! 
3 
2001 
I 2,985 2,080 3,101 0,492 
4 II 2,985 2,083 3,099 0,539 
5 
2002 
I 2,987 2,092 3,094 0,585 
6 II 2,989 2,099 3,090 0,629 
7 
2003 
I 2,992 2,116 3,081 0,670 
8 II 2,995 2,130 3,073 0,710 
9 
2004 
I 3,002 2,162 3,053 0,749 
10 II 3,007 2,188 3,037 0,786 
11 
2005 
I 3,021 2,249 2,996 0,822 
12 II 3,032 2,295 2,962 0,857 
13 
2006 
I 3,058 2,402 2,872 0,890 
14 II 3,078 2,480 2,793 0,922 
15 
2007 
I 3,100 2,496 2,752 0,912 
16 II 3,121 2,530 2,693 0,916 
17 
2008 
I 3,253 2,526 2,453 0,919 
18 II 3,338 2,534 2,222 0,923 
19 
2009 
I 3,359 2,510 2,190 0,887 
20 II 3,398 2,496 2,073 0,864 
 






I 3,215 2,627 2,423 0,848 
22 II 3,088 2,702 2,578 0,829 
23 
2011 
I 3,236 2,316 2,670 0,771 
24 II 3,287 1,989 2,768 0,724 
25 
2012 
I 3,186 2,065 2,886 0,748 
26 II 3,132 1,992 2,983 0,748 
27 
2013 
I 3,043 1,965 3,086 0,757 
28 II 2,957 1,919 3,175 0,763 
29 
2014 
I 3,048 2,205 2,989 0,764 
30 II 3,078 2,348 2,881 0,767 
31 
2015 
I 3,015 2,551 2,821 0,730 
32 II 2,982 2,699 2,736 0,706 
33 
2016 
I 3,026 2,652 2,722 0,722 
34 II 3,044 2,667 2,681 0,725 
35 
2017 
I 2,989 2,731 2,694 0,746 
36 II 2,957 2,776 2,688 0,761 
37 
2018 
I 2,970 2,795 2,650 0,937 
38 II 2,968 2,821 2,622 1,043 
Source: Processed by Authors, 2020 
 
 
 
 
